The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Still a National Crisis? by Backus, Mary Sue & Marcus, Paul
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2018
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Still a
National Crisis?
Mary Sue Backus
Paul Marcus
William & Mary Law School, pxmarc@wm.edu
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Backus, Mary Sue and Marcus, Paul, "The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Still a National Crisis?" (2018). Faculty Publications.
1897.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1897
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\86-6\GWN606.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-NOV-18 11:29
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases:
Still a National Crisis?
Mary Sue Backus* & Paul Marcus**
ABSTRACT
In 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright dramatically changed the landscape of
criminal justice with its mandate that poor criminal defendants be entitled to
legal representation funded by the government. As scholars and practitioners
have noted repeatedly over more than fifty years, states have generally failed
to provide the equal access Gideon promised. This Article revisits the ques-
tions raised by the authors over a decade ago when they asserted that a genu-
ine national crisis exists regarding the right to counsel in criminal cases for
poor people. Sadly, despite a few isolated instances where litigation has
sparked some progress, the issues remain the same: persistent underfunding
and crushing caseloads, and little support from the Supreme Court to remedy
ineffective assistance claims. The authors conclude that our patchwork system
of public defense for the poor remains disturbingly dysfunctional.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright1 moved the na-
tion forward in the quest for equal access in our criminal justice sys-
tem. With ringing language, the Court applied the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel2 to state criminal prosecutions and held that a poor
* Robert Glenn Rapp Foundation Presidential Professor of Law, University of
Oklahoma.
** Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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defendant is entitled to a lawyer even if he cannot afford to pay for
that aid.3 Many commentators properly noted then that this was a ma-
jor step, one which would change the way suspects were prosecuted
throughout the United States. One of the lawyers Clarence Earl
Gideon passed over to represent Gideon—after the Court’s reversal
of his self-represented first trial—even went so far to say: “In the fu-
ture the name ‘Gideon’ will stand for the great principle that the poor
are entitled to the same type of justice as are those who are able to
afford counsel.”4 The poor entitled to the same type of justice as are
those who are able to afford counsel? Alas, this was not to be.
For decades, broad concerns have been raised as to whether the
promise of Gideon has been kept.5 In the early part of this century,
3 [I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try
defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essen-
tial to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they
can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
4 The lawyer was Tobias Simon. His report on the case to the Florida Civil Liberties
Union is discussed in the foremost chronicle of the decision. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUM-
PET 239 (Vintage Books ed. 1989) (1964).
5 See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-counsel-
badly-battered-at-50.html [https://perma.cc/N4JN-AGG3] (“Only 24 states have statewide public
defender systems. Others flout their constitutional obligations by pushing the problem onto
cash-strapped counties or local judicial districts. Lack of financing isn’t the only problem, either.
Contempt for poor defendants is too often the norm. In Kentucky, 68 percent of poor people
accused of misdemeanors appear in court hearings without lawyers. In 21 counties in Florida in
2010, 70 percent of misdemeanor defendants pleaded guilty or no contest—at arraignments that
averaged less than three minutes.”).
In a news release from 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), while explaining why
it was filing a brief challenging the Pennsylvania indigent defense system, had its principal offi-
cials state their concerns:
“For too many public defenders, crushing caseloads and scarce resources make
it impossible to adequately represent clients who need and deserve assistance in
legal matters,” said Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch. “The Constitution of the
United States guarantees adequate counsel for indigent defendants, and the De-
partment of Justice is committed to ensuring that right is met.”
“This brief recognizes the importance of the right to counsel as fundamental to
a fair criminal justice process,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\86-6\GWN606.txt unknown Seq: 3 26-NOV-18 11:29
1566 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1564
the Constitution Project6 formed the National Right to Counsel Com-
mittee.7 Its goal was to look at indigent defense throughout the nation
to determine if the promise of Gideon was being kept, then make rec-
ommendations to remedy problems.8 For the first three years of the
Committee’s investigation, this Article’s authors served as reporters to
the Committee.9 In addition to contributing to the ultimate report of
the Committee, the authors wrote a lengthy law review article discuss-
ing what they deemed to be a genuine national crisis regarding the
right to counsel in criminal cases for poor people.10 What they saw was
a system of criminal justice which was not functioning in any sort of
responsible way for the many indigent defendants charged with
crime.11 While the problems were severe, they did see some room for
hope. This Article explores, a decade later, whether there have been
serious, positive changes to this system and evaluates whether that
hope has been realized as concrete action. This Article concludes that
this is not the case. The crisis remains and may even have become
more severe in most parts of our country.
Vanita Gupta, head of the Civil Rights Division. “The Civil Rights Division will
continue to ensure that this essential right is protected.”
“Public defenders around the country are being asked to do essential, even
heroic work, with a fraction of the resources they need,” said Director Lisa Foster
of the Office for Access to Justice. “When defenders are unable to do their jobs,
their clients are stripped of a critical constitutional right, and our justice system is
diminished.”
Press Release, DOJ, Department of Justice Files Amicus Brief in Pennsylvania Right to Counsel
Case (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-amicus-brief-penn
sylvania-right-counsel-case [https://perma.cc/EJ5B-SSA2].
6 Policy Counsel, CONSTITUTION PROJECT, https://www.constitutionproject.org/policy-
counsel/ [https://perma.cc/X56R-6MWW] (“Created out of the belief that we must cast aside the
labels that divide us in order to keep our democracy strong, The Constitution Project brings
together policy experts and legal practitioners from across the political spectrum to foster con-
sensus-based solutions to some of the most difficult constitutional challenges of our time.”).
7 NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 222 (2009)
(“The National Right to Counsel Committee is a bipartisan committee of independent experts
representing all segments of America’s justice system. The Committee was established in 2004 to
examine the ability of state courts to provide adequate counsel, as required by the United States
Constitution, to individuals charged in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases who are unable to
afford lawyers.”).
8 Id. at xi.
9 Our successors as Reporters were Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law and Dean Emeri-
tus, Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis; and the late Robert L. Spangenberg, Re-
search Professor and Founder, The Spangenberg Project, Center for Justice, Law, and Society,
George Mason University. See id. at xiii.
10 See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006).
11 Id. at 1130.
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I. IS IT HAPPENING EVEN TODAY?
Terrence Miller was charged with having committed serious drug
offenses. As reported in The Atlantic, he
met his lawyer for the first time for a few minutes in a stair-
well at the courthouse on the morning of trial. The lawyer
had not tried a criminal case in seven years and had been
appointed to Miller’s case only four days before trial. He
never spoke to any witnesses, or to Miller’s former attorney,
or to investigators in the public defender’s office. He didn’t
know what his client would say on the witness stand.12
When the lawyer asked for a continuance to prepare the case prop-
erly, the trial judge—concerned with his busy docket—denied the re-
quest.13 Miller was convicted, and his appeal to the New Jersey
Supreme Court was rejected.14 The dissenting justice bemoaned seeing
“an impoverished defendant . . . treated as just another fungible item
to be shuffled along on a criminal-justice conveyor belt” with “the
right to effective assistance of counsel [being] nothing more than the
presence of an appointed attorney at counsel’s table.”15
Gail Chester16 was indicted and charged with stealing several
items from the local Walmart valued at approximately seventy-two
dollars.17 Brought to the Harrison County Jail in Mississippi, Chester
waited and waited to see a lawyer and to have her day in court. She
remained in jail for eleven months before a lawyer was appointed to
represent her.18 She did not meet with that lawyer until thirteen
12 Andrew Cohen, How Much Does a Public Defender Need to Know About a Client?,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/how-much-
does-a-public-defender-need-to-know-about-a-client/280761/ [https://perma.cc/D6TC-UMMQ].
13 See id.
14 See State v. Miller, 76 A.3d 1250, 1254 (N.J. 2013). The majority explained its decision:
This is not the “rare” case in which the doctrine of fundamental fairness man-
dates reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Defendant was not deprived of compe-
tent counsel. He had a meeting with his attorney, albeit one constrained in duration
and conducted in a less than optimal location, prior to his suppression hearing.
Following that hearing and before the commencement of trial the next day, defen-
dant met in private with his counsel at the attorney’s office. The attorney claimed
he was prepared and conducted a vigorous defense on defendant’s behalf, and
there was no finding of prejudice.
Id. at 1268.
15 Id. at 1269 (Albin, J., dissenting).
16 This is a pseudonym to protect privacy.
17 NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S IN-
DIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 3 (Feb. 2003). The items were “a clock radio, a walkman, and a package
of batteries.” Id.
18 Id.
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months after the arrest.19 Indeed, “the first time she spoke to the law-
yer assigned to defend her was in court on the day her case was sup-
posed to go to trial. In June of 2002, nearly [fourteen] months after
her arrest, Chester pled guilty to misdemeanor shoplifting and was
released from the jail.”20
Henry James spent almost three decades in a Louisiana prison for
a crime he did not commit. He was convicted of aggravated rape in
1982, and “he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.”21 It was not until years later when a major New York law
firm22 became involved in James’s case that DNA testing was per-
formed. The testing showed that he could not have committed the
rape.23 At the trial, the victim had mistakenly identified James as the
attacker.24 In addition, James’s trial lawyer did not use a vital piece of
forensic evidence. The testing of the rape kit just before trial showed
that the attacker was a “non-secretor,” someone who “does not se-
crete antigens in their body fluids that would allow a serologist to de-
termine his blood type.”25 “James, however, is a secretor,”26 and thus
could not have committed the crime. This information was given to
defense counsel, but the lawyer did not share it with the jury.27 James
was released from prison in 2011.28
19 Id.
20 Id. According to the NAACP report, “[t]he cost to the taxpayers of Harrison County of
incarcerating Chester for nearly 14 months before her case made it through the courts [was]
[a]pproximately $12,090.” Id.
21 See Henry James, INNOCENCE PROJECT NEW ORLEANS, http://ip-no.org/exonoree-pro-
file/henry-james [https://perma.cc/T9WS-5223].
22 Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. See id.
23 See id.
24 See id. The manner of the misidentification was deeply troubling and easily avoidable,
as explained by the Innocence Project New Orleans:
Mr. James lived adjacent to the victim and spent most of the day before the crime
helping the victim’s husband repair his car. . . . Immediately after her attack, she
told police that she didn’t know her assailant but gave a brief description of her
attacker. It was only the next day, after a police officer presented her with a picture
of Mr. James, that she identified him as her rapist. The record contains no indica-
tion that the victim told the police that she had previously met her attacker; much
less, that he had spent the previous day with her husband.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. (emphasis omitted).
27 Id.
28 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\86-6\GWN606.txt unknown Seq: 6 26-NOV-18 11:29
2018] THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1569
Police arrested sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder for stealing a
backpack.29 The Bronx County Criminal Court set bail at $3,000, an
amount his family could not afford.30 He remained in Rikers Island in
pretrial detention for three years; he spent half that time in solitary
confinement.31
Browder was appointed a lawyer, and each time Browder main-
tained his innocence and requested a trial, he was offered a plea—
each refusal to accept a plea led to a delay.32 At that time, it took the
courts in the Bronx an average of 517 days to resolve criminal cases.33
The prosecutors asked for at least eight continuances.34 Throughout
this time, Browder continued to turn down plea offers, and the prose-
cutor finally dismissed the charges in June 2013.35 While he was in
prison, he experienced significant beatings and psychological damage,
leading to his eventual suicide after numerous attempts.36
Although the “Kids for Cash” scandal that came out of Penn-
sylvania in 2007 was attributable to the unethical and illegal choices of
two county judges,37 another key reason the scheme went unnoticed
for so long was due to a lack of legal representation.38 The former
judges received thousands of dollars from owners of for-profit juvenile
justice centers as they handed down lengthy sentences to juveniles
who committed minor offenses.39 More than fifty percent of the
29 See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/548C-GG22].
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Matt Pearce, Kalief Browder’s Family Mourns His Suicide and Urges Reforms, L.A.
TIMES (Jun. 8, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-kalief-browder-
family-20150608-story.html [https://perma.cc/P27M-7QJM].
34 See Gonnerman, supra note 29. R
35 Id.
36 See id.; Pearce, supra note 33. R
37 See Warren Richey, ‘Kids for Cash’ Judge Sentenced to 28 Years for Racketeering
Scheme, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/
0811/Kids-for-cash-judge-sentenced-to-28-years-for-racketeering-scheme [https://perma.cc/
JPK4-WD9Z].
An investigation revealed that half of the children who appeared in [the Penn-
sylvania] courtroom were not represented by a lawyer and were never advised of
their right to counsel. Of those unrepresented children, up to 60 percent were or-
dered by [one of the judges] to serve time at a detention facility.
What was not known, prior to the federal investigation, was that [the two
judges] were receiving secret payments from the private detention centers. The cen-
ters stood to profit from the higher number of juveniles they were housing.
Id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
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juveniles were not represented by counsel.40 Of those who were given
assigned counsel, their lawyers tended to be less experienced and
“easily intimidated by [the judges].”41 Assistant public defenders ex-
pressed concern about the sentences, but the Public Defender did not
investigate the concerns, nor did he effectively supervise the juvenile
cases.42 After a shake-up in the court system and in the Public De-
fender’s Office, juvenile detentions went down seventy percent.43
Donald Gamble, charged with two counts of armed robbery and
one count of aggravated assault, was jailed for sixteen months until a
law professor showed a prosecutor evidence of his innocence.44 Prior
to his obtaining representation, there was a ten-month period of no
progress on Gamble’s case.45 Yet, within a few hours of work on the
case, the professor realized that Gamble did not match the depiction
of the robber on the surveillance video.46 Officials in the Orleans Par-
ish District Attorney’s office dismissed the charges within five days
after being notified of the discrepancy.47 During his sixteen-month im-
prisonment, Gamble lost some of his teeth and needed surgery after
several inmate beatings.48 After Gamble’s release, Anderson Cooper
interviewed current and former public defenders in New Orleans on
60 Minutes.49
When Cooper asked the attorneys if they had innocent cli-
ents sent to prison because they didn’t have enough time to
spend on their case, all nine raised his or her hand. “We sim-
ply don’t have the time. We don’t have the money. We don’t
have the attention to be able to give to every single person,”
40 See id.
41 Dave Janoski & Michael P. Buffer, Panel Investigating Luzerne County Kids-for-Cash
Scandal Calls for More Oversight, REPUBLICAN HERALD (May 28, 2010), http://republicanherald
.com/news/panel-investigating-luzerne-county-kids-for-cash-scandal-calls-for-more-oversight-
1.818353 [https://perma.cc/LCX7-WHUA].
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 Inside NOLA Public Defenders’ Decision to Refuse Felony Cases, 60 MINUTES (April
16, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-new-orleans-public-defenders-decision-to-refuse-
felony-cases/ [https://perma.cc/HB6T-FXV7]. The law professor was Pamela R. Metzger, then of
Tulane University Law School. Id. Metzger is now Director of the Deason Criminal Justice Re-
form Center at Southern Methodist University’s Dedman School of Law. Pamela R. Metzger,
SMU DEDMAN SCH. L., https://www.law.smu.edu/professor-profiles/metzger [https://perma.cc/
9Z6E-EEY7].
45 See Inside NOLA Public Defenders’ Decision to Refuse Felony Cases, supra note 44. R
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 Id.
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Orleans Public Defender’s Office staff attorney Brandi Mc-
Neil said.50
In his interview on the television program, Orleans Public Defender
Derwyn Bunton stated that the New Orleans justice system was like a
“conveyor belt.”51
The lead plaintiff in a New York class action suit claiming sys-
temic ineffective assistance of counsel, Kimberly Hurrell-Harring, was
a nursing assistant and mother of two.52 She was arrested for
“sneak[ing] a small amount of marijuana to her husband,” then a
prison inmate.53 The usual charge for this crime was a misdemeanor
and did not often lead to a jail sentence.54 Moreover, this was the first
offense for Hurrell-Harring.55 Her assigned public defender had ear-
lier been accused of negligent actions and was later disbarred.56 He
took but a few minutes to meet with his client and then he recom-
mended that Hurrell-Harring plead guilty to a felony charge.57 She did
so, and then spent four months in jail before the conviction was
thrown out on appeal.58 During that time, she lost her nursing-assis-
tant license, her job, and her home.59
50 Emily Lane, Orleans Public Defenders on ‘60 Minutes’: Innocent Imprisoned Because
We’re Overworked, NOLA.COM (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2017/04/
orleans_public_defenders_on_60.html [https://perma.cc/Z4RT-KN3T].
51 Id.
52 See Tracy Frisch, Equal Before the Law? New York Counties Face Push to Upgrade
Public Defender System, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.truthout.org/news/item/32702-
equal-before-the-law-new-york-counties-face-push-to-upgrade-public-defender-system [https://
perma.cc/A5EP-S849].
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 Id. After years of litigation, the parties and the New York Governor’s Office reached a
favorable settlement the day before the class action case was to go to trial. See Victoria
Bekiempis, How New York Is Finally Helping Poor Defendants, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:47
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-tktk-landmark-public-defense-case-278889 [https://
perma.cc/KW6Z-APAZ]. As part of the settlement, every indigent defendant will be given a
lawyer at arraignment, and caseloads will be reduced in five counties, “substantially limit[ing]
the number of cases any lawyer can carry, thereby ensuring that poor criminal defendants get a
real defense.” Id. (quoting Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Begins Historic
Reformation of Public Defense in New York State (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nyclu.org/en/
press-releases/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-public-defense-new-york-state [https://per
ma.cc/9MQN-XAZ3]); see infra text accompanying notes 204–29. R
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II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In their earlier work, this Article’s authors tracked the scope and
bases for the Court’s numerous counsel decisions both expanding
Gideon60 and narrowing it.61 In the past decade—with one major ex-
ception—the Justices have spent little time considering right-to-coun-
sel issues in the bulk of prosecutions.62 The key exception here is that
the Court has been willing to extend Sixth Amendment scrutiny of the
performance of counsel to the plea bargaining setting. In Padilla v.
Kentucky63 the Justices decided that a criminal-defense attorney must
advise a client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea
before a deal is reached with the prosecutor.64 The Court expanded
this principle in two decisions holding that the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel applies to the plea bargaining stage in cases in which
counsel either failed to advise the client of a plea offer65 or incorrectly
advised the client about the state of the law resulting in the defendant
rejecting a plea offer.66
Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court has been generally
unwilling to become actively involved in reviewing claims of ineffec-
60 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–83 (1985) (holding that the government must
provide experts to indigent defendants if necessary for a fair trial); Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970) (holding that the right to counsel applies to preliminary hearing, even if
evidence at that hearing cannot be used against the defendant at trial); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 223–27 (1967) (holding that the right to counsel applies to pretrial matters, includ-
ing lineups).
61 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding no right to a lawyer unless
defendant is personally confronted); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (holding no
Sixth Amendment right unless defendant receives actual sentence of imprisonment); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (holding that right to counsel only applies after initiation of
adversary judicial proceeding).
62 The Court, however, has looked to the ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases.
See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775–76 (2017) (finding that defense lawyer acted ineffec-
tively by offering expert testimony that prisoner was statistically more likely to act violently in
the future because he was African American); Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088–89
(2014) (holding that defense lawyer’s mistake as to the correct law in applying for expert assis-
tance constitutes ineffective counsel); Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 952–53 (2010) (finding that
lower courts looked too narrowly at the actual prejudice requirement); Bobby v. Van Hook, 558
U.S. 4, 7 (2009) (finding it improper to rely too heavily on the American Bar Association guide-
lines for performance of counsel when they do not describe the norms at the time of
representation).
63 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The Court applied Padilla in Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958,
1966 (2017), where the defendant was able to establish the necessary prejudice under Strickland
“because he never would have accepted a guilty plea had he known that he would be deported as
a result.”
64 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357.
65 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 150–51 (2012).
66 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174–75 (2012).
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tive assistance of counsel under its holding in Strickland v. Washing-
ton.67 In this case, the Court established a very challenging two-part
ineffectiveness test.
First, “a convicted defendant [who] complains of the ineffective-
ness of counsel’s assistance . . . must show that counsel’s representa-
tion fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”68 There are
no specific guidelines for determining whether counsel meets an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness; instead, “[t]he proper measure of
attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms . . . considering all the circumstances.”69 The sec-
ond element of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is that “any
deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the de-
fense.”70 To satisfy the prejudice prong, “[t]he defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in the outcome.”71
67 466 U.S. 669 (1984).
68 Id. at 687–88.
69 Id. at 688.
70 Id. at 692.
71 Id. at 694. The first prong can be extremely difficult to satisfy; some courts have gone so
far as to say there will be no proper constitutional claim unless the legal representation “is so
lacking that the trial has become a farce and a mockery of justice.” Heath v. Vose, 747 A.2d 475,
477 n.1 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State v. Dunn, 726 A.2d 1142, 1146 n.4 (R.I. 1999)). The second
prong may be even more daunting, as explained by one Wyoming Supreme Court justice: “[I]t is
practically impossible to prove prejudice because it is practically impossible to prove that the
outcome would have been different had the jury been allowed to hear certain evidence. This is
especially true because our system does not allow a defendant to query the jury about its deliber-
ations.” Osborne v. State, 285 P.3d 248, 253–54 (Wyo. 2012) (Voigt. J., concurring). Further,
some courts rather routinely state that “if an ineffective-assistance claim can be disposed of
because the defendant suffered no prejudice, we need not determine whether counsel’s perform-
ance was deficient.” E.g., People v. Graham, 795 N.E.2d 231, 238 (Ill. 2003). The Supreme
Court’s most recent decisions in the area, though narrow, offer little hope for a relaxed applica-
tion of the standard. In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2017), the Court consid-
ered whether the trial judge’s error in closing the court room implicated Strickland. If the error
was structural, the question became whether under Strickland, actual prejudice had to be shown.
Id. at 1910. The majority answered affirmatively in rather stark fashion:
The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim.
The reason is that a defendant has a right to effective representation, not a right to
an attorney who performs his duties “mistake-free.” As a rule, therefore, a “viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’
until the defendant is prejudiced.” . . . [T]he rules governing ineffective-assistance
claims “must be applied with scrupulous care.”
Id. at 1910–12 (citations omitted). The majority in Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2066 (2017),
considering a collateral attack, refused to extend the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel trial re-
view to the performance of defense counsel on appeal:
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In 2006, there were “chilling examples . . . of abysmal representa-
tion that [were] nevertheless upheld under this constitutional test.”72
It is disheartening to report that those chilling examples continue to-
day. One of this Article’s authors explored the ineffective-assistance
claim in recent years,73 finding that cases involving truly careful moni-
toring of awful lawyering were relatively few in number.74 Instead, the
courts have been remarkably narrow in applying the Strickland test.
They continue to allow the system to deprive indigent defendants of
significant aid by competent lawyers. This is true even when there is
little question that defense lawyers in underfunded systems are over-
The criminal trial enjoys pride of place in our criminal justice system in a way
that an appeal from that trial does not. The Constitution twice guarantees the right
to a criminal trial . . . . The trial “is the main event at which a defendant’s rights are
to be determined, and not simply a tryout on the road to appellate review.” And it
is where the stakes for the defendant are highest, not least because it is where a
presumptively innocent defendant is adjudged guilty, and where the trial judge or
jury makes factual findings that nearly always receive deference on appeal and col-
lateral review.
Id. (citations omitted).
72 Backus & Marcus, supra note 10, at 1088. R
73 See generally Paul Marcus, The United States Supreme Court (Mostly) Gives Up Its Re-
view Role with Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1745 (2016).
74 See id. at 1764–65. Those that exist appear to be the exception to the rule. The most
notorious example in the last several years concerned the dozing attorney in United States v.
Ragin, 820 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2016). There, the Fourth Circuit found a constitutional violation
because the lawyer slept “during a substantial portion of the trial.” Id. at 622. The court ex-
plained further the constitutional issue the slumber raised:
Whether a lawyer slept for a substantial portion of the trial should be determined
on a case-by-case basis, considering, but not limited to, the length of time counsel
slept, the proportion of the trial missed, and the significance of the portion counsel
slept through. At the same time, however, while we decline to dictate precise pa-
rameters for what must necessarily be a case-by-case assessment, we caution district
courts that the scope of our holding today should not be limited to only the most
egregious instances of attorney slumber.
Id. at 622 n.11; see also United States v. Mohammed, 863 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the possibility of impeaching the
government’s central witness as biased against the defendant despite clear indication that he
should and could have done so); Weeden v. Johnson, 854 F.3d 1063, 1068–70 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek psychological evaluation of troubled
fourteen-year-old); State v. Sims, 769 S.E.2d 62, 66–67 (Ga. 2015) (holding that counsel was
ineffective for failure to object in murder trial to prosecutor’s opening statement referring to the
defendant’s silence prior to arrest); Freiburger v. State, 775 S.E.2d 391, 394–95 (S.C. Ct. App.
2015) (holding that counsel was ineffective in murder case where trial attorney did not rebut the
State’s ballistics evidence); State v. Barela, 349 P.3d 676, 681–82 (Utah 2015) (holding that coun-
sel was ineffective for failing to object to an erroneous state-of-mind requirement in jury instruc-
tions on elements of the crime).
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whelmed by their caseloads.75 Sixth Amendment claims have consist-
ently been rejected even in prosecutions in which counsel seemed to
be acting below an acceptable level of competence.
Federal judges argued in dissent that Robert Wayne Holsey’s trial
lawyers did not effectively represent him.76 “Holsey’s lead defense
lawyer drank a quart of vodka every night of Holsey’s trial” because
the lawyer was about to be sued and prosecuted for stealing client
funds.77 The lawyer later testified that “he ‘probably shouldn’t have
been allowed to represent anybody’ due to his condition.”78 Holsey’s
death penalty was allowed to stand because a majority of the circuit-
court panel found that the lawyer’s performance did not affect the
outcome of the trial.79
75 The structural gaps in funding for indigent defense remain stark throughout the United
States. One commentator recently wrote:
Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel standard lends itself to systematic
violations primarily because ensuring effective assistance of counsel for every crim-
inal defendant has significant monetary costs for the state. The state (or local juris-
diction, depending on what entity provides counsel for indigent defendants) has a
strong financial incentive to minimize the costs of indigent defense providers (usu-
ally public defender offices). As a result, many jurisdictions chronically and seri-
ously underfund their indigent defense systems. Public defenders in some
jurisdictions carry such enormous caseloads that they cannot possibly provide every
defendant, in the words of the Strickland Court, the “assistance of counsel guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment.” Indigent defense counsel carrying caseloads of
1000–1600 cases per year cannot possibly provide effective assistance.
Erica Hashimoto, Motivating Constitutional Compliance, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1001, 1019–20 (2016)
(footnotes omitted). Another commentator made the point even more succinctly: “Excessive
caseloads and severe underfunding of public defenders’ offices systematically deprive criminal
defendants of their right to effective counsel. These are well-documented problems, and the
need for reform is not new.” Ace M. Factor, Note, Lessons from New Orleans: A Stronger Role
for Public Defenders in Spurring Indigent Defense Reform, 66 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1567 (2017) (foot-
notes omitted).
76 Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1273. The dissenting opinion focused on the lack of effectiveness of the trial
lawyer:
I cannot believe that one juror hearing all of the mitigating evidence would not
credit Holsey’s experts and lay witnesses and find Holsey to be either fully mentally
retarded or borderline mentally retarded and so diminished in his cognitive and
behavioral capacity as to be either ineligible for or undeserving of the death pen-
alty. When combined with Holsey’s evidence of his horrific child abuse, none of
which was presented to his sentencing jury, there is a substantial probability that
one juror would not have voted in favor of the death penalty had this evidence
been introduced by competent counsel.
Id. at 1294. Holsey was executed at the end of 2014. Georgia Executes Robert Holsey After
Supreme Court Denies IQ Appeal, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014, 11:51 PM), http://www.nbcnews
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\86-6\GWN606.txt unknown Seq: 13 26-NOV-18 11:29
1576 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1564
Cedric Ivory’s lawyer at his murder trial allegedly was addicted to
drugs and was an alcoholic.80 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected Ivory’s ineffectiveness claim and noted that the lawyer “was
conscious throughout the proceedings, cross-examined the state’s wit-
nesses, moved for a judgment of acquittal, and made a coherent clos-
ing argument.”81
Daniel Larsen’s case is different; his ineffective-assistance claim
could not be rejected because it was not even raised until Larsen had
served more than fourteen years in prison for a crime he did not com-
mit.82 In 1999, he was found guilty of possession of an illegal knife, and
he was sentenced to twenty-eight years to life in prison.83 Numerous
credible witnesses known to the defense lawyer were available to tes-
tify at trial on Larsen’s behalf.84 They would have said that the two
arresting police officers detained the wrong man for the possession.85
Years later, a federal judge stated that these witnesses were “credible
and persuasive,” and that had the jury heard the testimony it would
not have voted to convict.86 Larsen’s trial lawyer did not call these
witnesses; he did not call any witnesses.87 The conviction was affirmed
on appeal in the state courts—no one thought to bring up the Sixth
Amendment contention in the California courts of appeal or in the
state supreme court.88 It was not until the California Innocence Pro-
ject became involved in Larsen’s case that the ineffective assistance
claim was even raised.89 Larsen was finally released from prison in
2013, after several federal habeas corpus rulings.90
.com/storyline/lethal-injection/georia-executes-robert-holsey-after-supreme-court-denies-iq-ap
peal-n264921 [https://perma.cc/8EWL-S8K2].
80 Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284, 295 (6th Cir. 2007).
81 Id.
82 Larsen v. Adams, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2009), abrogated on other
grounds, Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir.
2011).
83 Id. These previous convictions had occurred almost ten years earlier. Id. at 1127 n.4.
84 Id. at 1126 n.1.
85 Id. at 1140. The procedural history and findings are contained in the district court deci-
sion in the habeas corpus hearing. Id. at 1126–27. The ruling that ordered Larsen’s release was
affirmed on appeal in Larsen v. Soto, 730 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2013), amended and superseded on
denial of reh’g by 742 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2013).
86 See Larsen, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41.
87 Id. at 1135.
88 Id. at 1127.
89 See Daniel Larson, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://californiainnocenceproject.org/
read-their-stories/daniel-larsen/ [https://perma.cc/X3TE-WY5Z].
90 Id.
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In 2009, Jorge Rodriguez was sentenced to twenty years in prison,
followed by ten years of probation for the crime of burglary with an
assault or battery.91 Although subject to deportation for this convic-
tion as a noncitizen, the defendant was not advised of this fact by his
lawyer.92 The Florida procedural requirement was satisfied by the trial
judge telling Rodriguez during the plea hearing, “If you’re not a citi-
zen of the United States, not only could this deport you, it could pre-
vent you from ever coming back to this country again legally. Do you
understand that?”93 The Supreme Court’s Padilla decision, which re-
quires counsel to speak with the client about the possible deportation
consequence of a criminal conviction, had not yet been handed
down.94 The law in Florida was clear: “[P]rior to the decision in Pa-
dilla, no formal duty existed for counsel to advise clients of the immi-
gration consequences of a plea.”95 This fact was dispositive for both
the Florida judges and the federal district judge: “Under the law in
effect at the time of Petitioner’s plea, counsel had no duty to advise a
client of a non-criminal collateral consequence, and as a result, coun-
sel’s performance was not defective.”96 It is true that Padilla had not
yet been decided. It is also true that at the federal level the procedural
question was very narrow.97 Still, it is deeply troubling that not a single
judge—not one—expressed any concern that the lawyer had not spo-
ken with the client about such a highly significant aspect of the guilty
plea.98
It may be that Samuel Fields’s lawyer did perform capably at trial
for murder.99 Fields contended that his lawyer should have been more
91 Rodriguez v. Sec’y, No. 2:12-cv-289-FtM-29DNF, 2014 WL 7074210, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 15, 2014).
92 Id. at *6.
93 Id. at *7.
94 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. R
95 Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So. 3d 868, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
96 Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7074210, at *8.
97 Was this “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”? Id.
at *2.
98 See also Hanks v. State, 71 N.E.3d 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). There, the defendant was
sentenced to fifty years in prison for felony child molesting. Id. at 1181–82. He pleaded guilty to
the charge in an “open offer” process where the state would not make a sentencing recommen-
dation. Id. at 1181. He complained that his lawyer did not advise him of the judge’s strict sen-
tencing practices in sex-offender cases and that his lawyer gave no advice as to “the wisdom of
accepting” the government’s offer. Id. at 1188. The trial judge himself noted that he likely had a
reputation as a “hanging judge” in sex-offender cases. Id. at 1187. The court held that there was
no Sixth Amendment violation because the lawyer’s performance did not fall “short of the stan-
dard of reasonable competence demanded” at the time of the trial. Id. at 1188.
99 See Fields v. White, No. 15-38-ART, 2016 WL 3574396 (E.D. Ky. June 23, 2016).
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forceful in the closing argument to the jury.100 In a habeas review, a
court noted that “perhaps” trial counsel could have been more aggres-
sive.101 That contention is not what is noteworthy about the opinion
dismissing Fields’s Sixth Amendment claim. What is striking about the
case is the manner in which the judge described the ineffective assis-
tance review called for by the Supreme Court:
[T]he Constitution does not guarantee that a defendant will
have a perfect lawyer. It does not guarantee that he will have
a good lawyer. It does not even guarantee that he will not
have a “really bad one.” (“[T]he Supreme Court has gone
out of its way to make clear that, in order to obtain a new
trial on ineffective-assistance grounds, the petitioner must do
more than show that he had a bad lawyer—even a really bad
one.”).102
III. FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR LEGAL SERVICES
In 2006, we asserted that the drastic underfunding of the defense
function for poor people was a root cause of the intractable problems
plaguing the patchwork of state indigent defense systems in the
100 Id. at *20.
101 Id. at *22.
102 Id. (quoting Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also Bahtuoh v.
Smith, 855 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2017). There the court did not find ineffective assistance even
though defense counsel failed to present the defendant’s testimony which had been promised in
his opening statement. Id. The court wrote that applying the Strickland standard in a federal
habeas action meant that the federal judges’ review was “doubly deferential.” Id. (quoting Cul-
len v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)). The petitioner in Waiters v. Lee, 857 F.3d 466, 468–69
(2d Cir. 2017), also pursued a habeas action, claiming a Sixth Amendment violation. In rejecting
the claim, the majority of the court explained the extremely difficult burden: “The operative
question in reviewing a state court’s Strickland ruling is thus ‘not whether a federal court be-
lieves the state court’s determination was incorrect[,] but [rather] whether that determination
was [objectively] unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’” Id. at 478 (alterations in
original) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2006)). The defense lawyer there did
not offer expert testimony on the question of whether the 130-pound defendant was so intoxi-
cated after sixteen drinks that he could not have formed the necessary intent to commit the
crime. Id. at 485–86 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The dissenter disagreed with the majority’s Strick-
land analysis:
The refusal by defense counsel to introduce his only powerful piece of evi-
dence is simply unaccountable. At trial, he offered no explanation. He seems not to
have discussed the issue with his client before or during the evidentiary colloquy.
At the hearing to vacate Waiters’s conviction . . ., conducted by the same state trial
judge, defense counsel could not recall why he let pass the offered opportunity to
call an expert. A pity: I would be deeply curious to know.
. . . .
. . . [T]he evidence the jury never got to see would have altered the entire
evidentiary picture, such that acquittal was at least reasonably probable.
Id. at 485–87 (brackets omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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United States.103 Excessive public defender caseloads, insufficient
compensation for appointed and contract defense lawyers, limited ac-
cess to attorneys, lack of ancillary resources critical to competent rep-
resentation, and the resulting ineffective assistance of counsel, among
other problems, can all be traced to inadequate funding.104 In the in-
tervening decade, despite repeated calls for additional funding by vir-
tually every stakeholder in the criminal justice system,105 the fiscal
103 Others have also noted this problem. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, Gideon’s BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 38 (2004) (“Funding for indigent defense services is shamefully in-
adequate.”); AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 3 (1982) [hereinafter AM. BAR
ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE] (“[I]ndigent defendants are not being provided competent counsel
due to lack of adequate funding for such services. . . . This bleak picture, twenty years after the
Gideon decision, is a severe blot upon the fabric of the nation’s constitutional and historic com-
mitment to a free society with justice and liberty for all.”); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J.
Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13, 13 (1994) (“[T]he current
level of funding for a majority of the indigent defense programs around the country has reached
the crisis level and threatens the effective implementation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimi-
nal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 9–10 (1997) (“Thus, notwithstanding nominal budget increases,
spending on indigent defendants in constant dollars per case appears to have declined signifi-
cantly between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.”).
104 See AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 103, at 3. R
105 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON RESOLUTION 104A, at 4–5 (2013) (urging Con-
gress to fund a National Center for Indigent Defense Services); JOHN P. GROSS, NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, Gideon at 50: PART I—RATIONING JUSTICE: THE UNDERFUNDING OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS 18–19 (2013); Eric Holder, Attorney General, Address at the Jus-
tice Department’s 50th Anniversary Celebration of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Gideon
v. Wainwright (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-
speaks-justice-departments-50th-anniversary-celebration-us [https://perma.cc/EEE6-YE4C].
This cry for help has been voiced repeatedly by the defense bar. This statement by Michael
Barrett, Director of the Missouri State Public Defender Office, is typical:
We’ve been jumping up and down trying to call attention to this matter for the
last two years, telling the state, “This [lawsuit] is coming, this is coming,” although
we didn’t know precisely when it would come. . . . It was inevitable, just given all
the studies that have been done regarding our caseload and the limited number of
lawyers the state gives us.
Matt Ford, A ‘Constitutional Crisis’ in Missouri, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlan
tic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/missouri-public-defender-crisis/519444/ [https://perma.cc/PL8V-
Y4EU]. Barrett also noted: “A lawyer can probably only handle 40, maybe 50 case[s] at any one
time. . . . Our lawyers have three times that amount, and people are taking pleas because they’re
sitting in local jail waiting for their lawyer to get to them.” Id.
Judges—from state trial court judges to Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court—also echo this
concern. See, e.g., Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1095 (2016) (“[Indigent defendants must
rely on] overworked and underpaid public defenders. As the Department of Justice explains,
only 27 percent of county-based public defender offices have sufficient attorneys to meet nation-
ally recommended caseload standards.”); State v. Bernard, 528-021, p. 9 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct.,
Parish of Orleans 4/8/16) (“The defendants’ attorneys have demonstrated that they cannot effec-
tively represent their clients without adequate funding and resources. The court has no difficulty
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picture has not changed much. Rather, there are some indications that
the funding situation has deteriorated even further since 2006.106
States continue to utilize a variety of methods to meet their Sixth
Amendment obligation to provide attorneys for poor criminal defend-
ants.107 Some indigent defense systems are organized at the state level,
while others rely primarily on localities to administer public defense
programs, and still others use a hybrid delivery system combining the
two.108 States also differ in how services are delivered, such as through
salaried public defenders, appointed counsel paid by the hour, con-
tract attorneys who handle all cases in a defined jurisdiction, or a com-
bination of these.109 Organizational structures are further complicated
by funding systems, which also vary by state.110 In approximately half
the states, funding is provided exclusively through state appropria-
tions, while the other half use some combination of state and local
funds in varying ratios.111 Although some states’ appropriations only
provide a small fraction of necessary funding, Pennsylvania is the only
remaining state that provides no state funds and leaves the entire re-
sponsibility for funding indigent defense to local governments.112
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the resulting economic
downturn hit state budgets hard, with thirty-seven states facing budget
shortfalls in 2009.113 The Brookings Institution reported that state tax
receipts “fell by roughly $100 billion in real terms from 2007 to 2009,”
a drop more precipitous and longer lasting “than in previous down-
turns, including a pair of back-to-back recessions in the early
1980s.”114 The federal government attempted to provide fiscal relief to
states and localities during this “Great Recession” through a stimulus
concluding the defendants’ constitutional right to assistance of counsel is being violated.”); see
also Eve Brensike, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV. 597, 598
(2011) (“[C]riminal defendants routinely face the threat of incarceration (or continued incarcer-
ation) without the aid of competent counsel.”).
106 See infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text. R
107 For a complete description of the organizational structure and funding sources for each
state, see generally STEPHEN D. OWENS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 246683, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, FY 2008–2012—
UPDATED (2015).
108 See id. at 1.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See id. See generally HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDI-
GENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2010).
112 See OWENS ET AL., supra note 107, at 1, 24. R
113 NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 7, at 59. R
114 Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS INSTITU-
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package to the tune of $145 billion distributed “to help states fill their
budget gaps.”115 Even with this federal assistance, however, “large
budget gaps opened in nearly every state, including a record number
of states (43) that confronted shortfalls in the middle of a budget cy-
cle . . . . Overall, states faced more than $500 billion in cumulative
shortfalls from 2009 to 2012.”116
Compounding the shortfalls in state revenues, states also had to
contend with rising demand for spending, particularly involving public
welfare programs, as a result of the dramatic employment loss associ-
ated with the economic downturn.117 This recession was notable for
the remarkable breadth and depth of historic employment losses.118
As employment and personal income dropped, enrollments in in-
come-based programs like Medicaid and unemployment insurance
climbed.119 Similarly, more defendants qualified for public-defense
services during these tough economic times.120 In short, during the
Great Recession, states faced rising demand for public services at a
time when revenues were dropping dramatically. States attempted to
address these significant budget gaps through a number of fiscal strat-
egies, including raising revenues through tax and fee increases and
drawing down reserves.121 Given the size of the budget shortfalls, how-
ever, most states simply were forced to cut spending.122
Even before the economic crisis hit, “many indigent defense sys-
tems across the country were already facing serious budget shortfalls
and cutbacks.”123 Spending cuts related to the recession exacerbated
the situation. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that state gov-
ernment spending on indigent defense steadily dropped from 2008
TION (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-
recession/ [https://perma.cc/K5ES-7SNR].
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id.; Christopher J. Goodman & Steven M. Mance, Employment Loss and the
2007–09 Recession: An Overview, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2011, at 5–8.
118 See Goodman & Mance, supra note 117, at 3. R
119 See Gordon, supra note 114. R
120 The Census Bureau reported that “the number of Americans living below the official
poverty line [in 2010], 46.2 million people, was the highest number in the 52 years the bureau has
been publishing figures on it.” Sabrina Tavernise, Soaring Poverty Casts Spotlight on ‘Lost Dec-
ade,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/14census.html [https://
perma.cc/HS26-ZCH7]. Joblessness was the central factor in the growing number of poor Ameri-
cans, with just over fifteen percent of Americans, the highest level since 1993, living below the
poverty line ($22,314 for a family of four). See id.
121 See Gordon, supra note 114. R
122 See id.
123 NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 7, at 59. R
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through 2012, with a significant decline in intergovernmental transfers
of state funds to localities.124 These budget cuts occurred as caseloads
for states’ public defenders grew four to seven percent.125 For most
states during the Great Recession, not only was there simply no
money to expand much-needed funding for public defense, budgets
were cut even in the face of the critical and continually growing
need.126
Although a majority of state budgets appear to have recovered
from the economic downturn, a significant number of states are still
struggling to recover from losses in state revenue attributable to the
recession.127 “Overall, state tax revenue has bounced back more
slowly after the 2007–09 recession than the three previous down-
turns,” and the economic recovery is uneven across the states.128 “Low
energy prices, weak consumer spending, and . . . slow[] growth in state
personal income” have contributed to an uneven recovery in state rev-
enues and a reluctance on the part of states to take on new spend-
ing.129 This slow, uneven recovery means that there is little hope that
states have the resources to expand funding for public defense now or
any time in the near future.
With the exception of its two most populous counties, Oklahoma
and Tulsa, the state of Oklahoma directly funds public defense
through the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (“OIDS”).130
Oklahoma provides a stark example of the lingering effects of the
Great Recession and the inability of states to adequately fund their
public defense systems.131 The state “made deep cuts to state appro-
124 ERINN HERBERMAN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE GOVERN-
MENT INDIGENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 2008–2012—UPDATED 1 (2015).
125 See Jennifer Burnett, Justice in Jeopardy: Budget Cuts Put State Public Defense Systems
Under Stress, CAPITOL IDEAS, July/Aug. 2010, at 16; infra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. R
126 See generally Burnett, supra note 125; infra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. R
127 See Barb Rosewicz & Daniel Newman, Tax Revenue Has Recovered in 31 States, Despite
Flat Q3, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (May 17, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analy
sis/analysis/2017/05/17/tax-revenue-has-recovered-in-31-states-despite-flat-q3 [https://perma.cc/
N6XG-Q265].
128 Id.
129 Id. The fiscal outlook for states remains bleak. See LUCY DADAYAN & DONALD J.
BOYD, ROCKEFELLER INS. OF GOV’T, 2016: ANOTHER LACKLUSTER YEAR FOR STATE TAX REV-
ENUE 4, 4–5 (2017) (documenting “disappointing” state tax collections in 2016 and “anticipating
continued slow growth in tax revenues for the remainder of fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year
2018”).
130 OWENS ET AL., supra note 107, at 15. R
131 The OIDS has had a rocky history since its creation in 1991. See Backus & Marcus,
supra note 10, at 1119–20 (describing the litigation that spurred the state legislature to create the R
agency and its early funding challenges).
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priations during the Great Recession, and state funding has never re-
turned to pre-recession levels.”132 “Since 2015, the downturn in the
[state’s] energy sector,” along with tax cuts by the Republican-led leg-
islature, resulted in “two consecutive years of large budget shortfalls
and cuts.” “Adjusted for inflation, [Oklahoma’s fiscal year] 2017
budget is almost 15 percent less than the budget for [fiscal year] 2007,
for a total decline of $1.17 billion” in state expenditures during this
period.133
For the OIDS, those state budget woes have resulted in the
double hit of declining state appropriations and growing caseloads.134
“The agency warned in its 2016 Annual Report that” the loss of fund-
ing and resulting crushing caseloads “have ‘jeopardized the agency’s
ability to continue to provide constitutionally effective legal represen-
tation.’”135 From 2002 to 2016, OIDS attorneys saw their “caseload[s]
rise by nearly 50 percent, while their state appropriations . . . dropped
by almost 35 percent.”136 In a single year, “between 2015 and 2016, the
total number of cases [OIDS attorneys] handled rose by 17
percent.”137
Just to make it to the end of the 2017 fiscal year, the OIDS sought
an emergency supplemental appropriation of $1.5 million.138 The state
legislature provided $700,000.139 Although the agency is among a se-
lect few receiving a small increase in its fiscal year 2018 budget,140 the
agency has warned that the funding lost over the last few years must
be restored in order for Oklahoma to meet state and federal constitu-
tional requirements to provide defense services to indigent criminal
defendants.141 Otherwise, the fallout from the prolonged funding crisis
could mean the release of defendants due to lack of counsel, reversal
132 8 Key Facts About Oklahoma’s Budget (#betterok Budget Bootcamp), TOGETHER OKLA.
(Jan. 5, 2017), http://togetherok.org/8-key-facts-oklahomas-budget-betterok-budget-bootcamp/
[https://perma.cc/T9NZ-SPQQ].
133 Id.
134 Ryan Gentzler, The Indigent Defense System Needs $1.5 Million to Avoid Another Con-
stitutional Crisis, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 19, 2017), http://okpolicy.org/indigent-defense-sys
tem-needs-1-5-million-avoid-another-constitutional-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/THL6-68SG].
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 FY 2018 Budget Highlights, OKLA. POL’Y INST., 4 (June 8, 2017), http://okpolicy.org/fy-
2018-budget-highlights/ [https://perma.cc/7J5T-LMVB].
141 OKLA. INDIGENT DEF. SYS., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2016).
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of convictions where necessary expert services could not be provided,
or the inability to prosecute death-penalty cases.142
Like Oklahoma, Maine found itself facing a shortfall in its indi-
gent funding for the 2017 fiscal year. Since 2010, Maine has provided
defense attorneys to poor criminal defendants through a court-ap-
pointed system administered by the Maine Commission on Indigent
Legal Services.143 In early May of 2017, the Maine Commission an-
nounced that it had run out of money and could no longer pay defense
attorneys for their constitutionally mandated work.144 With two
months left to go in the fiscal year, the Maine Commission’s coffers
were empty due to a reduced budget and the legislature’s failure to
appropriate supplemental funds to make up the roughly $3 million
gap.145 As a result, attorneys representing the state’s poor criminal de-
fendants had to wait two months until the new fiscal year to be paid
for their work.146
Maine’s court-appointed defense attorneys are familiar with
working unpaid. Prior to 2017, the Maine Commission most recently
ran out of money at the end of the fiscal year in 2013, “but the [state]
Legislature acted in time to fund the shortfall.”147 In fact, the Maine
Commission was underfunded for the first three years of its existence,
and underfunding was common prior to the Maine Commission crea-
tion “when the service was run by the Maine Judicial Branch.”148 Run-
ning out of money has become a perennial issue in Maine, plaguing
the state’s ability to meet its constitutional obligations under the Sixth
Amendment, especially the last few months of the fiscal year.149 One
state legislator worried that these nearly annual shortfalls could mean
that “the State will not be able to proceed with criminal prosecutions”
at all.150
142 Id.
143 See Maine Commission on Legal Services, MAINE.GOV, http://www.maine.gov/mcils/
[https://perma.cc/ZG8L-QFRW].
144 Matt Byrne, State Funding for Court-Appointed Attorneys Runs Out, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (May 3, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com/2017/05/03/state-funding-for-court-appoin
ted-attorneys-runs-out/ [https://perma.cc/B2KG-MEMD].
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 Id.
148 Scott Dolan, Maine’s Court-Appointed Lawyers Face Fiscal Crunch, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/02/02/court-appointed-lawyers-face-
fiscal-crunch_2013-02-03/ [https://perma.cc/8K2Q-CAKX].
149 See id.
150 Id.
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North Carolina also faces routine year-end budget shortfalls.
North Carolina’s Commission on Indigent Defense Services, launched
in 2001, utilizes a combination of salaried public defenders and con-
tract and appointed counsel to provide legal representation to indi-
gent defendants throughout the state.151 Appointed counsel handle a
little more than half of North Carolina’s indigent cases each year.152
From 2009 to 2016, the Commission’s appropriated funds for ap-
pointed counsel fell short in the last few months of the fiscal year by
an average of over $6 million each year.153 Like many states, North
Carolina’s year-end funding gaps have been fueled by rising
caseloads.154 Between 2002 and 2016, the Commission saw a 35.5%
increase in its caseload and, at the same time, experienced budget
cuts.155
In 2011, the North Carolina Commission took steps to decrease
expenditures to close these persistent budget gaps by severely reduc-
ing the hourly rates paid to appointed counsel.156 District court ap-
pointments absorbed the steepest cuts, nearly 27%, to an hourly rate
of $55.157 Most hourly rates were cut to below the original rates estab-
lished by the North Carolina Commission over a decade ago.158 Al-
though the dramatic reductions in hourly rates helped close the
budget gap, as a consequence, the state is losing a significant number
of attorneys willing to accept court-appointed cases.159 In particular,
many of the most experienced and skilled attorneys stopped handling
indigent cases, and there is concern that some areas of the state may
not have enough qualified attorneys to handle the caseload.160 After
the rate decreases took effect, a survey of state court judges showed
that 67% had seen a decline in the quality of representation.161
The Great Recession did not just cripple state budgets; county
and municipal governments felt the pinch as well. The bursting of the
housing bubble and the resulting significant declines in housing prices
caused by the Great Recession meant steep declines in property-tax
151 See N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FY2016 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 3, 10, 33 (2017).
152 See id. at 15.
153 Id. at 18.
154 Id. at 32.
155 Id. at 33–35.
156 Id. at 15.
157 Id. at 16.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 16–17.
160 Id. at 16.
161 Id. at 17.
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collections, a staple of most local-government revenue.162 The housing
bust infected other areas of the economy driving state revenue as well.
“For example, it is estimated that the decline in housing values re-
sulted directly in a decrease in consumer spending of some $240 bil-
lion in 2010, which in turn significantly impacted state and local
government sales tax receipts.”163 The resulting severe cutbacks in
government services in some localities literally meant turning the
lights out as a number of municipalities turned off street lights at night
to save money.164 And, like states, economic recovery for counties and
municipalities remains slow and uneven.165 As of the end of 2016,
ninety-three percent of counties still had not recovered to prereces-
sion levels of total employment, unemployment rate, size of the econ-
omy, and home values.166
The economic scourge of the Great Recession, along with the
slow recovery, made it nearly impossible for states and localities to
address the lack of adequate funding for public defense programs. As
a result, the crushing caseloads for public defenders and decreases in
compensation for court-appointed attorneys have also persisted.
In Nashville, Tennessee, during fiscal year 2012, public defenders
“handling misdemeanors . . . took up to 1,000 cases each, typically
giving them less than an hour to spend on each case.”167 General
caseload numbers from fiscal year 2014 suggest that the Nashville of-
fice would have needed more than twenty additional attorneys to
meet national caseload guidelines.168
162 LUCY DADAYAN, ROCKEFELLER INST., THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON LO-
CAL PROPERTY TAXES 6–7 (2012).
163 Lawrence L. Martin, Richard Levey & Jenna Cawley, The “New Normal” for Local
Government, 44 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 17S, 17S (2012).
164 See id. at 22S.
165 See EMILIA ISTRATE & DANIEL HANDY, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., THE STATE OF COUNTY
FINANCES: PROGRESS THROUGH ADVERSITY 1 (2016).
166 Eric Morath, Six Years Later, 93% of Counties Still Have Not Recovered from Reces-
sion, Study Finds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2016, 7:34 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/01/
12/six-years-later-93-of-u-s-counties-havent-recovered-from-recession-study-finds/?mg=prod/ac
counts-wsj [https://perma.cc/M5Y6-BED8].
167 Stephen Hale, Buried Under Workload, Public Defender’s Office Pushes Back, NASH-
VILLE SCENE (Feb. 2, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.nashvillescene.com/news/cover-story/article/
20850716/facing-an-unmanageable-workload-the-public-defenders-office-is-now-limiting-the-
cases-it-takes [https://perma.cc/TL83-JALY].
168 See id. In 1973, the National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) on Criminal Justice Stan-
dards and Goals, funded by the federal government, made the first numerical recommendation
for maximum annual caseloads for a public defender office: on average, the lawyers in the office
should not carry caseloads that exceed, per year, more than 150 felonies; 400 misdemeanors; 200
juvenile court cases; 200 mental health cases; or 25 appeals. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS 276 (1973). Although these lim-
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In Hobbs, New Mexico, “[t]he number of felony cases . . . ha[s]
almost doubled since 2011, . . . even as the number of public defenders
dropped by one-third.”169 In October of 2016, New Mexico’s Chief
Public Defender ordered his public defenders to stop taking addi-
tional cases when they were averaging over 200 felony cases per attor-
ney.170 He was held in contempt of court, and the public defenders
were forced to continue accepting new cases.171
In Washington State before a 2013 class-action lawsuit success-
fully challenged the practice in two cities, two part-time appointed
lawyers representing indigent misdemeanor defendants handled ap-
proximately 1,000 cases each per year.172 As a result, the lawyers
“often spent less than an hour on each case,” engaged in little to no
investigation, only communicated with their clients for a few minutes
in an open courtroom, and based pleas entirely on the presumption
that the police report was accurate.173
In 2014, one Marion County, Indiana, public defender handled
1,333 cases in a single twelve-month period, which is more than three
times the maximum annual caseload allowed for misdemeanors under
national standards.174
In 2010, a single attorney in Bonneville County, Idaho, was “as-
signed to handle more than four full-time attorneys’ worth of work—
and a caseload that allows only one hour and ten minutes per cli-
ent.”175 “The office’s five defenders [were] cover[ing] the number of
cases that [eleven] attorneys would be reasonably expected to handle
its are often cited as national standards, they were based primarily on qualitative and anecdotal
information rather than empirical evidence. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL
AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 5 (2014). Newer workload studies,
which focus on the average amount of time an attorney should expect to spend on a particular
type of case in order to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel, suggest that the NAC
standards are often too high. See, e.g., id. at 5–7.
169 See Doug Mataconis, There’s a Criminal Defense Crisis in New Mexico, and Nobody
Seems To Care, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/
theres-a-criminal-defense-crisis-in-new-mexico-and-nobody-seems-to-care/#ixzz4q7Wktz4V
[https://perma.cc/2Y5J-8BXT].
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
173 Id.; Brief of Plaintiffs at 2–3, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122
(W.D. Wash 2013) (No. 2:11-cv-01100).
174 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIANA: EVALUATION OF
TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 197 (2016); ISTRATE & HANDY, supra note 165. R
175 NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, THE GUARANTEE OF COUNSEL: ADVOCACY &
DUE PROCESS IN IDAHO’S TRIAL COURTS, at iv (2010).
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according to national norms,” with the added challenge from the lack
of any investigative staff.176
In addition to overwhelming caseloads that make competent rep-
resentation nearly impossible, another consequence of strained state
and local budgets is interfering with delivering on the promise of
Gideon.177 States are turning increasingly to forms of cost recovery for
providing legal defense to indigent clients and imposing “new and
often onerous ‘user fees’” as a means to generate revenue to pay for
the criminal justice system.178 A recent survey by National Public Ra-
dio (“NPR”) determined that in at least forty-three states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia defendants can be billed for a public defender.179
These fees, which often carry high interest and penalties for nonpay-
ment, can saddle criminal defendants with debt that impacts their abil-
ity to reenter society and often lands them back in jail.180 According to
a yearlong investigation by NPR, since 2010, forty-four states have
increased criminal and civil court fees on everything from parole or
probation officers to room and board for jail and prison stays.181 There
is, however, a growing realization that saddling poor defendants with
the costs of the criminal justice system through bail, fines, and fees,
and then incarcerating them when they fail to pay, is akin to imprison-
ing people simply because they are poor.182
Fees to cover the cost of public defense are particularly troubling
because the cost often discourages individuals from exercising their
constitutional right to an attorney and allows states to dodge the man-
date of Gideon to provide representation to poor criminal defendants.
In Michigan, for example, one judge estimated that the threat of pay-
ing the full cost of assigned counsel resulted in misdemeanor defend-
ants waiving their right to counsel nearly ninety-five percent of the
176 Id.
177 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. R
178 ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2010).
179 See Samantha Sunne, Why Your Right to a Public Defender May Come With a Fee, NPR
(May 29, 2014, 10:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/29/316735545/why-your-right-to-a-pub
lic-defender-may-come-with-a-fee [https://perma.cc/9GYE-J3JD]; see also BANNON ET AL., supra
note 178, at 12. R
180 See BANNON ET AL., supra note 178, at 5. R
181 See As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=312158516 [https://perma.cc/
H2BF-KNDQ].
182 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 1 (2015).
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time.183 Rather than bolster the funding for public defense, this re-
sponse to declining revenues has further undermined the legitimacy of
Gideon’s guarantee to the right to counsel for all.
IV. LITIGATION TO PROMOTE REFORM
Chronic underfunding, exacerbated by the Great Recession and
apparently unsolvable in the political sphere, often sparks litigation as
advocates, seeking a way to compel action, turn to courts. The director
of the Missouri Public Defender Office expressed the level of exasper-
ation that led to litigation in that state: “I’ve done everything short of
setting myself on fire to draw attention to the situation that the state
has put us in.”184
In 2006, the authors envisioned systemic litigation as one method
to motivate state legislatures to address the deficiencies of their indi-
gent defense systems.185 While acknowledging that litigation did not
always lead to sustained practical results,186 we nevertheless endorsed
systemic litigation as a tool to “spur legislative action and to educate
the public about the failings of a given system.”187 Since that time, this
type of litigation has continued to evolve and has achieved real pro-
gress in a number of states, including Idaho, New York, and Penn-
sylvania, along with promising suits pending in other states, including
California, Missouri, and Louisiana.188 The outcomes in Idaho, New
York, and Pennsylvania highlight two key variables that seem to im-
pact the success of recent structural challenges to indigent defense sys-
tems: (1) the involvement of the Justice Department and (2) a shift in
legal analysis away from Strickland.189
183 See BANNON ET AL., supra note 178, at 12. R
184 Margaret Stafford, Missouri Sued Over Low Funding for Public Defense System, U.S.
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2017, 2:33 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/missouri/articles/2017-
03-09/aclu-others-sue-missouri-over-public-defender-system [https://perma.cc/EH32-YK6B].
185 Backus & Marcus, supra note 10, at 1128–29; see also Cara H. Drinan, The Third Gener- R
ation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 432–43 (2009)
(discussing trends in this type of structural litigation to address Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel violations).
186 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 10, at 1116–22. R
187 See id. at 1129.
188 See Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices Are Suing—
and Starting to Win, ABA J. (Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_gideon
_revolution [https://perma.cc/38WV-VZES] (discussing current litigation). While the focus here
is on systemic challenges, direct appeals of individual cases and postconviction proceedings con-
tinue to shape Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence and prod states to action as well.
See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. R
189 See Laird, supra note 188. R
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A. Idaho
It was no surprise to anyone when the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) filed a class action complaint in Idaho in 2015 alleg-
ing that Idaho’s county-based approach to indigent defense was con-
stitutionally inadequate.190 The lawsuit, which was based on a detailed
2010 study of the right to counsel in Idaho by the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association,191 identified a litany of problems, which
included
widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high
attorney caseloads and workloads; lack of consistent, effec-
tive, and confidential communication with indigent clients;
inadequate, and often nonexistent, investigation of cases;
lack of structural safeguards to protect the independence of
defenders; lack of adequate representation of children in ju-
venile and criminal court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack
of performance-based standards; lack of ongoing training
and professional development; and lack of any meaningful
funding from the State.192
County-based systems like Idaho’s are particularly prone to these
types of deficiencies and have long been criticized as inadequate.193
At the same time that the ACLU was preparing and filing the
lawsuit, the Idaho legislature was taking steps to improve Idaho’s pub-
lic defense system. In 2014 the legislature created the independent
State Public Defense Commission (“PDC”).194 The legislature empow-
ered the PDC to promulgate rules related to training and education
190 “In August of 2013, Idaho Chief Justice Roger Burdick testified before a legislative
interim committee” that “[f]rankly, our system for the defense of indigents, as required by
Idaho’s constitution and laws, is broken.” Steve Taggart, The (Unsurprising) ACLU Public De-
fender Lawsuit Against Idaho, IDAHO POL. WKLY. (June 21, 2015), http://idahopoliticsweekly
.com/politics/399-the-unsurprising-aclu-public-defender-lawsuit-against-idaho [https://perma.cc/
8LBU-3PPD]. Even the Governor had acknowledged as much in 2015 when he asked the state
legislature to “address[] the very real challenge we face in our public defense system.” C.L.
“BUTCH” OTTER, STATE OF THE STATE AND BUDGET ADDRESS 8 (2015), https://gov.idaho.gov/
mediacenter/speeches/sp_2015/SOS%20FY%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/46U3-2ET4]. He con-
ceded that “[t]he courts have made it clear that [Idaho’s] current method of providing legal
counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional muster.” Id.
191 See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 175; Taggart, supra note 190. R
The report, authorized by the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission and the Idaho Juvenile Justice
Commission, found that none of Idaho’s jumble of county administered public defense systems,
with no state funding or oversight, met constitutional standards. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DE-
FENDER ASS’N, supra note 175, at iii. R
192 Complaint para. 1, Tucker v. State, No. CV-OC-2015-10240 (Idaho Dist. Ct. June 17,
2015).
193 See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 7, at 54–55. R
194 See David Carroll, Idaho Governor Signs Public Defense Commission Bill into Law,
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for defense attorneys and to create “[u]niform data reporting require-
ments” that included “caseload, workload and expenditures.”195 Two
years later, the legislature significantly increased the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the PDC to promulgate additional rules.196 These
rules related to procedures for the creation, “oversight, implementa-
tion, enforcement and modification of indigent defense standards”;
“requirements for contracts between counties and private attorneys
for the provision of indigent defense services”; data reporting man-
dates; and procedures for grant applications by which counties can ap-
ply for state funds to offset the cost of compliance with indigent-
defense standards.197
Idaho’s move towards reform did not derail the lawsuit, but the
state district court almost did.198 Even though the trial court agreed
that “the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring constitutionally-
sound public defense,” the court dismissed the complaint.199 The court
found that the named plaintiffs did not have standing to sue, in part
because none had yet been convicted or pursued appeals or postcon-
viction relief; thus, there was no actual injury.200 According to the
state district judge, a case-by-case review under Strickland was the
proper vehicle for challenging ineffective assistance of counsel, while
the plaintiffs’ complaint asked the court to “override” the legislature
and “reshape” Idaho’s entire indigent defense system.201 Invoking the
familiar separation-of-powers concern about “invad[ing] the province
of the legislature,”202 the court insisted that the judiciary “d[id] not
have the power or jurisdiction” to take the sweeping action re-
quested.203 Upon appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and re-
versed the dismissal based on the lower court’s standing decision and
remanded back to the district court.204 The court rejected the lower
SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-governor-signs-public-de
fense-commission-bill-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/LKL3-ZZJX].
195 IDAHO CODE §§ 19-849, 19-850 (2016).
196 See Carroll, supra note 194. R
197 IDAHO CODE § 19-850(1)(a).
198 See Mem. Op. & Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, Tucker v. State, No. CV-OC-2015-
10240 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Jan. 20, 2016).
199 Id. at 5, 31.
200 Id. at 21–22.
201 Id. at 24–25.
202 Id. at 29, 30. See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Un-
derfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1744 (2005) (discussing that many
courts are loath to infringe upon legislative prerogatives due to separation of powers).
203 Mem. Op. & Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 25, Tucker, No. CV-OC-2015-10240.
204 Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 62–69, 73 (Idaho 2017). The Idaho Supreme Court did
uphold the dismissal as to the governor as a named defendant, however, finding the causal link
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court’s reasoning that Strickland governed. It found that Strickland’s
case-by-case analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel was “inappli-
cable when systemic deficiencies in the provision of public defense are
at issue.”205 Instead, the court cited United States v. Cronic206 in finding
that the plaintiffs had “alleged actual and constructive denials of
counsel at critical stages of the prosecution,” a violation of constitu-
tional and statutory requirements.207 Similarly, the Idaho Supreme
Court also rejected the trial court’s separation-of-powers concern. The
court determined that the doctrine was not implicated because “[t]he
right to counsel . . . is not entrusted to a particular branch of govern-
ment” and the “requested relief d[id] not ask the judiciary to order
the Legislature to do anything.”208
The Idaho Supreme Court essentially adopted the arguments of
the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) amicus curiae brief filed in
the case.209 The brief distinguished between a claim that a defendant
has been denied the assistance of counsel, whether actually or con-
structively, and a claim that his lawyer’s performance was constitu-
tionally ineffective.210 The DOJ argued, and the Idaho Supreme Court
agreed, that “[t]he availability of pre-conviction civil actions for sys-
temic denials of counsel, whether actual or constructive, is critical to
protecting the fundamental right that Gideon recognized.”211 Both the
DOJ brief and the court cited to Hurrell-Harring v. State,212 discussed
in the next Section.
B. New York
Like Idaho, New York delivers public defense through its coun-
ties, which may opt to establish a public defender office, contract with
a legal aid society, or utilize assigned private counsel.213 Although
New York provided for public defense for indigent criminal defend-
ants even before Gideon, its “patchwork” of systems experienced the
between the governor and the appellants’ injuries too attenuated to support standing. Id. at
64–66.
205 Tucker, 394 P.3d at 62 (citations omitted).
206 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
207 Tucker, 394 P.3d at 63.
208 Id. at 72, 73.
209 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, Tucker, 394
P.3d 54.
210 Id. at 17.
211 Id. at 2; Tucker, 394 P.3d. at 62–63.
212 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010); Tucker, 394 P.3d at 62, 73; Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, 5, 19–23, 26, 30, Tucker, 394 P.3d 54.
213 N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 2013).
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usual problems: underfunding, lack of standards, and overworked and
underresourced attorneys.214 The persistent problems drew media at-
tention,215 sparked a successful lawsuit to increase abysmally low as-
signed counsel pay rates,216 and motivated Chief Judge Judith Kaye to
seek reform by establishing the Commission on the Future of Indigent
Defense Services, or more commonly, the Kaye Commission.217
After two years of research and investigation, the Kaye
Commission
concluded that there is, indeed, a crisis in the delivery of de-
fense services to the indigent throughout New York State
and that the right to the effective assistance of counsel, guar-
anteed by both the federal and state constitutions, is not be-
ing provided to a large portion of those who are entitled to
it.218
It recommended a “statewide defender system” as “the only solution
to the crisis in indigent defense representation in New York State.”219
While efforts were underway to spur action on the Kaye Commis-
sion findings and recommendations, the New York Civil Liberties
Union (“NYCLU”) filed a class action suit on behalf of twenty crimi-
nal defendants in five very diverse New York counties.220 The suit al-
leged that “the structural and systemic failings of the public defense
system,” lack of funding, resources, and oversight violated the consti-
214 See Geoff Burkhart, Public Defense: The New York Story, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2015, at 22,
23 (discussing New York’s early history of indigent defense).
215 For example, Jane Fritsch and David Rohde’s New York Times three-part series, Two-
Tier Justice, after a seven-month analysis of thousands of city records and court cases in 2000
concluded that almost no part of the indigent defense system functions as it was intended. See
Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, Lawyers Often Fail New York’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/08/nyregion/lawyers-often-fail-new-york-s-poor.html [https://
perma.cc/BU7D-E3R9]; Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, For the Poor, a Lawyer with 1,600 Clients,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/09/nyregion/for-the-poor-a-lawyer-
with-1600-clients.html [https://perma.cc/8RXM-LQNA]; Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, For Poor,
Appeals Are Luck of the Draw, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/
10/nyregion/for-poor-appeals-are-luck-of-the-draw.html [https://perma.cc/WAN9-87CX].
216 See N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (hold-
ing fixed rates and caps for assigned counsel unconstitutional as a violation of the right to legal
representation and ordering an increase).
217 See generally COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006).
218 Id. at 15.
219 Id. at v.
220 See Hurrell-Harring et al. v. State of New York (Challenging New York State’s Failure to
Provide Adequate Public Defense Services), N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/
en/cases/hurrell-harring-et-al-v-state-new-york-challenging-new-york-states-failure-provide-ade
quate [https://perma.cc/V58S-DVFV].
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tutional right to effective assistance of counsel.221 The litigation drag-
ged on for seven years before settling on the eve of trial.222
The trial court initially refused to strike the complaint,223 but the
Appellate Division reversed the trial court and dismissed the action as
nonjusticiable, invoking both Strickland and separation of powers in
its rationale.224 The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed
the Appellate Division and reinstated the claim.225 It grounded its de-
cision on the holding that the Strickland postconviction remedial stan-
dard was the wrong standard in a class action claim seeking
prospective relief for systemic deficiencies.226 The court insisted that
enforcement of a clear constitutional or statutory mandate is the
proper work of the courts.227 The court determined that “[g]iven the
simplicity and autonomy of a claim for nonrepresentation, as opposed
to one truly involving the adequacy of an attorney’s performance,
there is no reason . . . why such a claim cannot or should not be
brought without the context of a completed prosecution.”228
Late in the game, approximately one month before the settle-
ment was announced, the DOJ entered the fray and filed a statement
of interest.229 The DOJ sought to provide the court with a “framework
to assess” the plaintiffs’ claim of “‘constructive’ denial of counsel.”230
Without taking a position on the merits of the case, the department
advised the court to consider the structural deficiencies of the New
York system, such as lack of adequate funding, large workloads, lack
of oversight, and lack of independence, in determining whether a law-
yer can “fulfill the[] basic obligations to prepare a defense.”231 In addi-
tion to considering structural deficiencies, the DOJ encouraged the
court to examine the “traditional markers of representation,” such as
meaningful client-attorney contact, investigation, and advocacy, to as-
221 Amended Class Action Complaint paras. 6, 12–15, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2008), 2008 WL 7801315.
222 See supra note 220. R
223 See Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5479, at *16 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2008).
224 See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352, 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
225 See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227–28 (N.Y. 2010).
226 See id. at 221–22.
227 See id. at 225–26.
228 Id.
229 See Statement of Interest of the United States, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 2014).
230 See id. at 1, 14.
231 See id. at 10, 11–12.
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sess whether there has been a constructive denial of counsel.232 Ac-
cording to the statement, either of these characteristics of a system—
structural deficiencies or absence of markers of representation—could
result in nonrepresentation in violation of the Sixth Amendment.233
Finally, the statement addressed the separation-of-powers issue. It re-
minded the state court that if the court held that the plaintiffs had
been constructively denied the right to counsel on a systemic basis, the
court has broad injunctive authority to remedy those constitutional
violations.234
The settlement that came on the heels of the DOJ’s submission to
the court was sweeping and meaningful. New York agreed to provide
counsel at arraignment, establish workload limits, implement stan-
dards, ensure effective supervision and training, provide access to re-
sources like investigators and experts, and pay the cost of
implementing these reforms in the five counties named as defend-
ants.235 Importantly, responsibility for implementing the reforms rests
with the state’s independent Office of Indigent Legal Services (“ILS”)
and the Indigent Legal Services Board (“ILSB”), both of which had
been established in 2010 as the litigation dragged on.236
The Executive Director of the NYCLU declared the settlement a
victory for equal justice and proclaimed that
[f]or the first time, New York State is acknowledging its con-
stitutional responsibility to provide lawyers to poor defend-
ants who have been forced to navigate the criminal justice
system undefended and alone. . . . More than 50 years after
the Supreme Court called the right to public defense an “ob-
vious truth,” today our state begins making it an “actual
truth.”237
232 Id. at 7.
233 Id. at 8.
234 Id. at 10 n.16.
235 Stipulation & Order of Settlement at 5–16, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014).
236 See id. at 2–3; N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 832, 833 (McKinney 2013).
237 Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of
Public Defense in New York State (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/settle
ment-begins-historic-reformation-public-defense-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/9MQN-
XAZ3].
ILS has been making real progress in its work to improve the quality of public defense in
New York. In May of 2017, ILS rolled out its mandatory caseload standards for the five Hurrell-
Harring settlement counties. See ILS, A DETERMINATION OF CASELOAD STANDARDS PURSUANT
TO § IV OF THE HURRELL-HARRING V. THE STATE OF NEW YORK SETTLEMENT 14 (2016). After
studying a number of other recent caseload studies and conducting their own through the
RAND Corporation, ILS established caseload standards that are much more stringent than the
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In a letter to then–Attorney General Eric Holder, the director of
ILS acknowledged that the DOJ’s statement of interest had played a
significant role in propelling the parties towards settlement.238 The let-
ter thanked Holder for his strong leadership on working to ensure the
right to counsel for poor defendants across the nation.239
Of course, the Hurrell-Harring settlement was only a first step,
with its comprehensive reforms limited to the five counties in the
suit.240 The settlement also inspired a push to extend the reforms, in-
cluding increasing state funding, throughout the entire state.241 In 2016
the New York State Assembly unanimously passed legislation to do
just that, but Governor Cuomo halted the reforms with a last-minute
veto based on his concerns about cost.242 Governor Cuomo, however,
made good on his promise to work with the legislature to bring the
groundbreaking terms of the Hurrell-Harring settlement to the rest of
the state. In April of 2017, Governor Cuomo announced a legislative
agreement on the fiscal year 2018 state budget which includes funding
“to extend the reforms provided for in the Hurrell-Harring settlement
to all 62 counties in New York.”243
old 1973 NAC Standards and Goals. See id. at 2, 13, 14. ILS determined that the NAC standards
were woefully outdated for modern criminal law practice and that abandoning them would result
in a significantly reduced overall workload for public defenders. See id. at 3. For example, the
NAC standards called for a limit of 400 misdemeanors per year, whereas the ILS standards limits
misdemeanors to 300. See id. at 2, 14. Similarly, the NAC standards allow an attorney to handle
up to 150 felonies a year, whereas the ILS standards set a significantly lower limit of only 50 in
the violent felony category. See id. In addition to providing for the maximum number of cases in
each of seven discrete categories a public defender may handle, the standards also dictate the
average minimum number of hours per case in each of those same categories that assigned pri-
vate counsel are expected to devote. See id. at 14.
238 See Letter from William J. Leahy, Director, ILS, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. (Nov.
13, 2014), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Hurrell-Harring%20Leahy%20Letter%20To%20AG%20
Holder%20111314.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT6Y-JHEY].
239 See id.
240 See Stipulation & Order of Settlement, supra note 235. R
241 See Memorandum from Andrew Cuomo, Governor, State of N.Y., to New York State
Senate, Veto #306 (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=00000159-583a-d437-a37
d-7dbab7db0001 [https://perma.cc/3ZAN-DQ4P]. The bill also included funding for representa-
tion in certain noncriminal cases in family and surrogate court (such as custody and termination
of parental rights) beyond what is required under Gideon. Id at 1.
242 See id. at 2.
243 Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo and Legislative Lead-
ers Announce Agreement on FY 2018 State Budget (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
news/governor-cuomo-and-legislative-leaders-announce-agreement-fy-2018-state-budget [https:/
/perma.cc/F8AY-7LE3].
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C. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania is now the lone state that shifts the entire burden of
public defense to counties and provides no funding, no standards, and
no oversight to the local systems.244 A recent ruling by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, however, may change that. The decision has
the potential to spur the same kind of reform that New York State has
seen from its high court decision. The case, Kuren v. Luzerne
County,245 was a class action alleging that the county’s failure to mini-
mally fund the Office of the Public Defender resulted in overwhelm-
ing workloads and an inability to provide the basic elements of
constitutionally adequate representation.246 A few months before the
case was filed, the Chief Public Defender, Al Flora, an original named
plaintiff in the action,247 had been forced to begin declining cases due
to the overwhelming workload. As a result, the other named plaintiffs
were all criminal defendants who were entitled to representation but
had to navigate the criminal justice system without an attorney.248
The Commonwealth Court, Pennsylvania’s intermediate appel-
late court, upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.249 The
court was not persuaded by the reasoning in Hurrell-Harring, but
rather insisted that
there is no precedent from the United States Supreme Court
acknowledging that a constructive denial of counsel claim
may be brought in a civil case that seeks prospective relief in
the form of more funding and resources to an entire office,
as opposed to relief to individual indigent criminal
defendants.250
244 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Up until 2016, Utah shared Pennsylvania’s R
hands-off approach, but Utah has now established a state-funded Indigent Defense Commission,
leaving Pennsylvania as the lone state eschewing state involvement in the delivery of public
defense. See Jessica Miller, With Its Members Selected, the Indigent Defense Commission Will
Start Working on Utah’s Public Defender Problems, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2016, 10:04 AM),
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=4484365&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/E43M-PL8Q].
245 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016).
246 Id. at 725.
247 Flora was eventually dropped from the case for lack of standing, but the action pro-
ceeded with the criminal defendants as the named plaintiffs. See Flora v. Luzerne Cty., 103 A.3d
125, 133 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146
A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016).
248 See Complaint para. 108, Flora v. Luzerne Cty., No. 2012-04517 (Luzerne Cty. Ct. C.P.
Apr. 10, 2012).
249 Flora, 103 A.3d at 140.
250 Id. at 136.
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The Commonwealth Court was not moved by the allegations in the
complaint that public defenders were unable to meet or communicate
with clients, conduct investigation or discovery, prepare for trial, or
properly litigate appeals.251 The judges there characterized these fail-
ings as “only the fear” that the indigent plaintiffs might “not be ade-
quately represented.”252 That made the complaint a Strickland claim:
“Should the legal representation assigned to the individual Indigent
Clients prove ineffective and cause them prejudice, their recourse is to
bring a post-conviction Strickland claim.”253
Like New York’s highest court in Hurrell-Harring, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and recognized a “cog-
nizable cause of action whereby a class of indigent defendants may
seek relief for a widespread, systematic and constructive denial of
counsel when alleged deficiencies in funding and resources provided
by the county deny indigent defendants their constitutional right to
counsel.”254 Asserting that it would be “illogical” to apply Strickland
to structural claims like this one, the court found that “[n]onetheless,
relief is available, because the denial of the right to counsel, whether
actual, or as here, constructive, poses a significant, and tangible threat
to the fairness of criminal trials, and to the reliability of the entire
criminal justice system.”255
Once again, the DOJ weighed in and filed an amicus curiae brief
in the appeal.256 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the DOJ’s
framework for assessing how a plaintiff class can show the “likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury” required for a pro-
spective claim of a constitutional violation.257 Prospective injunctive
relief for a constructive denial of counsel is available in two instances.
First, “when . . . the traditional markers of representation—such as
timely and confidential consultation with clients, appropriate investi-
gation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—
are absent or significantly compromised.”258 Second, “when substan-
tial structural limitations—such as a severe lack of resources, unrea-
251 Id. at 137.
252 Id.
253 Flora, 103 A.3d at 137.
254 Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 743 (Pa. 2016); see also id. at 751–52.
255 Id. at 744; see also id. at 746.
256 Id. at 717.
257 Id. at 744.
258 Id.
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sonably high workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender
offices—cause that absence or limitation on representation.”259
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided with the DOJ
on establishing the right of indigent defendants to challenge systemic
deficiencies prior to conviction, the court denied the writ of manda-
mus the plaintiffs were seeking to order the county to increase fund-
ing.260 Instead, the court remanded the action back to the trial court,
where the plaintiffs could then pursue injunctive relief, having estab-
lished a cognizable claim.261 As of the time of writing this Article, the
case remains pending. Shortly after the decision, State Senator Stew-
art Greenleaf introduced legislation to establish the Pennsylvania
Center for Effective Indigent Defense Legal Representation to facili-
tate improvements in public defense across the state.262 As the Senator
recognized, “It’s more likely there will be more lawsuits filed in other
counties, and possibly the state.”263
V. MOVING FORWARD
The outcomes in Idaho, New York, and Pennsylvania highlight
two key variables that seem to impact the success of recent structural
challenges to indigent defense systems: (1) the involvement of the
DOJ and (2) a shift in legal analysis away from Strickland. These two
variables are somewhat linked, however, as a central feature of the
DOJ’s filings in recent litigation arguing that Strickland does not gov-
ern prospective constructive denial of counsel claims.
Both of the U.S. Attorneys General who served during the eight
years of the Obama Administration, Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch,
were outspoken advocates for improving the quality of indigent de-
fense. Attorney General Holder, in particular, followed up these
words with action. Shortly after taking office in 2009, Holder acknowl-
edged the continuing crisis in public defense and told the American
Council of Chief Defenders that when he took the oath of office and
swore to uphold the Constitution, “[s]upporting and defending the
Constitution includes, in my view, a responsibility to serve as guardi-
ans of the rights of all Americans, including the poor and underprivi-
259 Id.
260 Id. at 752.
261 Id. at 751–52.
262 See S.B. 61, 2017 Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (Pa. 2017).
263 Colt Shaw, Ruling Boosts Overworked Public Defenders in Only State that Doesn’t Fund
Them, GOVERNING (Nov. 4, 2016, 10:22 AM), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-
safety/tns-pennsylvania-public-defenders.html [https://perma.cc/PA9G-4BAK].
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leged.”264 Early in his tenure, Holder convened the National
Symposium on Indigent Defense, subtitled “Looking Back, Looking
Forward, 2000–2010,” which brought together stakeholders from all
parts of the criminal justice system to review the progress of the last
decade and to “identify[] critical areas for improvement.”265 He prom-
ised that group that the entire DOJ would “focus on indigent defense
issues with a sense of urgency and a commitment to developing and
implementing the solutions we need.”266 The DOJ, he pledged, was
committed to “tak[ing] concrete steps to make access to justice a per-
manent part of the work of the Department of Justice.”267
Following the symposium, Attorney General Holder launched
DOJ’s Office for Access to Justice (“ATJ”) in March 2010 to address
the crisis in indigent defense services and to advance other access-to-
justice initiatives.268 The office coordinates the DOJ’s multifaceted ef-
forts to improve indigent defense as well as access-to-justice issues in
the civil justice system.269 As part of its efforts to protect the constitu-
tional guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel, the ATJ has
developed a robust statement-of-interest practice. Of the nine state-
ments of interest or amicus briefs that the ATJ has filed since its in-
264 Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Address at the American Council of Chief Defenders Con-
ference (June 24, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-ameri
can-council-chief-defenders-conference [https://perma.cc/JKJ7-TU5F]. Holder gave many
speeches over the course of his tenure calling attention to the problems in indigent defense
systems across the country and outlining the DOJ’s actions to address the problem. See, e.g., Eric
Holder, Attorney Gen., Address at the American Bar Association’s National Summit on Indi-
gent Defense (February 4, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-hold
er-speaks-american-bar-association-s-national-summit-indigent [https://perma.cc/4FJK-A5VC].
265 Nat’l Justice Inst., Office of Justice Programs, National Symposium on Indigent Defense:
Looking Back, Looking Forward, 2000–2010, https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/indigent-defense/
Pages/indigent-defense-symposium-2011.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HPM-GFGD]; see also Eric
Holder, Attorney Gen., Address at the Department of Justice National Symposium on Indigent
Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-addresses-department-justice-national-symposium-indi
gent [https://perma.cc/2DPB-VR75].
266 Holder, supra note 265. R
267 Id. Attorney General Lynch voiced the same message, emphasizing the DOJ’s commit-
ment to fulfilling Gideon’s promise, stating “that this Department of Justice and this entire ad-
ministration will continue to . . . do everything in our power to further th[e] important mission”
of “ensuring that in the United States there is indeed no price tag on justice.” Loretta E. Lynch,
Attorney Gen., Remarks at White House Convening on Incarceration and Poverty (Dec. 3,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-
white-house-convening-incarceration-and [https://perma.cc/3TCF-68VT].
268 Office for Access to Justice, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/atj [https://perma.cc/33SA-
VCYU].
269 Id.
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ception, five of them have been in right-to-counsel cases.270 In
addition to Idaho, New York, and Pennsylvania, the ATJ filed state-
ments of interest in Washington271 and Georgia.272
In these submissions, the DOJ provided courts the legal frame-
work to recognize civil constructive-denial-of-counsel claims seeking
injunctive relief. Key to that framework, in the context of systemic
claims, is abandoning Strickland and its postconviction test for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.273 When a public defender or appointed
counsel is a lawyer in name only, without the time and resources to
deliver competent representation, the issue is not effective assistance
of counsel; it is nonrepresentation. Thus, courts may consider whether
structural limitations so handicap an attorney that he is unable to ful-
fill the basic obligations to prepare a defense and find a violation of
Gideon without waiting for a conviction. This approach, as we have
seen in Idaho, New York, and Pennsylvania, has the potential to gen-
erate system-wide reform.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the DOJ will continue its
work on indigent-defense issues under the Trump Administration.274
270 Court Filings in Support of Access to Justice, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/atj/court-fil-
ings-support-access-justice [https://perma.cc/Q243-9DMS]; see supra notes 209, 229, 256 and ac- R
companying text; infra notes 271–72 and accompanying text. R
271 Statement of Interest of the U.S., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122
(W.D. Wash., Aug. 8, 2013) (No. C11-1100). In Wilbur, the United States provided its expertise
by recommending that if the court found for the plaintiffs, it should ensure that public defense
counsel have realistic workloads and sufficient resources to carry out the “hallmarks of mini-
mally effective representation.” Id. at 10.
272 Statement of Interest of the U.S., N.P. v. State, No. 2014-CV-241025 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Mar. 13, 2015) (addressing juveniles’ right to counsel).
273 See, e.g., supra note 255 and accompanying text. R
274 The DOJ website continues to highlight the significance of its work on indigent defense.
See Indigent Defense Grants, Training, and Technical Assistance, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/
atj/indigent-defense-grants-training-and-technical-assistance [https://perma.cc/YGZ3-65DW].
For instance, the page devoted to Indigent Defense Grants, Training and Technical Assistance is
impressive, and describes a number of grant programs designed to improve public defense sys-
tems and the quality of representation of indigent defendants. In addition, the webpage high-
lights other grant initiatives aimed at collecting data and supporting research in indigent defense.
Although many of these programs appear to have been initiated during the Obama Administra-
tion (in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015), Trump’s DOJ has reconfirmed that it “has been working to
develop strategies, tools, and resources to help better understand and address the challenges to
the effective provision of indigent defense.” Id.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions has spoken publicly either as a Senator or as a member of
the President’s Cabinet—in speeches, press releases, and congressional testimony—about a
number of criminal justice subjects, including drug restrictions, sentencing, and prosecuting civil
rights violations. See, e.g., Jefferson Sessions, Attorney Gen., Address at the Department of Jus-
tice Civil Rights Division Awards Ceremony (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-department-justice-civil-rights-division [https://per
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CONCLUSION
In this thought-provoking Symposium,275 we acknowledge the ex-
cellent scholarship highlighting the many problems remaining with
our criminal justice system even fifty years after the report by the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.276 None of these
problems, however, will be changed significantly without allegiance to
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As the Supreme Court has
written, “Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be
represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have.”277 It is clear that at the
adjudicatory level, the defendant “cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to [the Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court] to be an obvious truth.”278
Are lawyers ultimately provided for indigent defendants in the
United States? Yes, overwhelmingly we continue to find that there are
lawyers appointed for the majority of poor suspects who are entitled
to counsel. As the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, however, it is
not simply the assignment of a lawyer which will satisfy the constitu-
tional mandate.
The special value of the right to the assistance of counsel
explains why “[i]t has long been recognized that the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”
The text of the Sixth Amendment itself suggests as much.
The Amendment requires not merely the provision of coun-
sel to the accused, but “Assistance,” which is to be “for his
defence.” Thus, “the core purpose of the counsel guarantee
was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was con-
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fronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy
of the public prosecutor.” If no actual “Assistance” “for” the
accused’s “defence” is provided, then the constitutional
guarantee has been violated.279
In far too many prosecutions across the nation, it is truly shocking
to report that nothing resembling the effective assistance of counsel
can be found. Public and appointed lawyers are underfunded and
overworked. State justice systems have inadequate financing and
poorly conceived structural bases. Some defendants can be forced to
wait years before their lawyers even speak with them. Lawyers all too
often engage in “meet and greet” representation, spending mere min-
utes on a client’s case before advising that accused person to plead
guilty.
No knowledgeable observer of our criminal justice system dis-
putes this deeply troubling situation. Yet, many legislatures are either
unable or unwilling to provide adequate funding to defense systems.
Most judges across the nation—including our own Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court—turn a blind eye to obvious failures to provide vigor-
ous representation to defendants, no matter how rich or poor.
This Article began by asking whether in the past decade there
have been serious, positive changes to this system and whether that
hope has been realized as concrete action. Sadly, the answer here is
without dispute: in most jurisdictions, little has changed for the better.
There are some notable exceptions, as we have discussed. Still, until
such change can be made across our nation in providing competent
lawyers with reasonable time to spend on individual cases, our country
will continue to see a terrible failure as to the Sixth Amendment and
as to other key provisions of our Constitution as well.
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